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ABSTRACT
Migration did not figure in the European Security Strategy of 2003. 
Never mentioned as a threat, it was not even mentioned as a risk. 
Thirteen years later, migration is widely cited in the new European 
Union Global Strategy. Much richer than the previous security 
document and global in aspiration, the Global Strategy treats 
migration as a challenge and an opportunity, recognising the key 
role it plays in a rapidly changing security landscape. However, this 
multi-faceted perspective on migration uncovers starkly different 
political and normative claims, all of which are legitimate in principle. 
The different narratives on migration present in the new strategic 
document attest to the Union’s comprehensive approach to the issue 
but also to critical and possibly competing normative dilemmas.
The launch of the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) suffered from “bad timing”.1 
The result of the ‘leave or remain’ referendum in Great Britain held in June 2016, which 
was interpreted as a setback for the European Union (EU), called into question not only the 
‘appropriateness’ of issuing a (global) strategy, but also the very meaning of the European 
Union as an exemplary and appealing regional integration project. Few commentators have 
noticed, though, that the words emphasizing the “internal challenges” of the Union were 
also meant to underline the deep repercussions of the “refugee crisis” on the EU and its 
member states.2 Statements, such as “we live in times of existential crisis […] our Union is 
under threat […] our European project is being questioned” or “never has our unity been so 
challenged”3 aptly describe the internal crisis generated by the EU’s inability to face the huge 
migration inflows it has been experiencing over the last three years. Remarkably, it was just 
a few months before the release of the EUGS that the European Commission admonished 
several member states for having “resorted to reintroducing temporary internal border 
controls, placing in question the proper functioning of the Schengen area of free movement 
and its benefits to European citizens and the European economy”.4
1See for example Tocci, “Interview with nathalie Tocci”.
2exceptions to that were, for example, Sidiropoulos, “The eU Global Strategy”, and Mälksso, “From the eSS to the eU Global 
Strategy”.
3european Union, Shared Vision, Common Action (EUGS), 13, 16.
4european commission, Back to Schengen, 2.
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84   M. CECCORULLI AND S. LUCARELLI
Migration is not described as a ‘security threat’ in either the EUGS or any past migra-
tion-related document, such as the previous European Security Strategy of 2003. Indeed, this 
may explain to some extent why it did not appear in a document named “security strategy”. 
However, in the EUGS, which is a foreign policy strategy as much as – if not more than – a 
security strategy, migration is probably the most frequently mentioned issue area, discussed 
with reference to foreign policy objectives (including internal repercussions), geographical 
areas and the purported values of the European Union. Pointing out the important role that 
migration plays in the EUGS is the first objective of this article.
The second is to highlight the different rationales of the EU’s migration policy, which 
are embedded – but identifiable – in the different narratives present in the EUGS (and 
other documents). Narratives of migration are basically short stories that enshrine a view 
of who migrants are with respect to the receiving community.5 Narratives can function as 
legitimising stories for specific policy actions, and at the same time gain strength from being 
put into practice. Much like any other narrative, narratives of migration told by the hosting 
community are not just neutral descriptive devices, but indicators of that community’s 
understanding of social relations, as well as factors legitimising political decisions. There 
has been a wide debate on how securitising narratives of migration have allowed for the 
adoption of securitised practices towards migration.6 Much less attention has been paid to 
the range of different narratives present in the various EU documents dedicated to migra-
tion and now summarised in the EUGS. The second aim of this article is to point them out.
Finally, the third aim is to determine the political and normative dilemmas associated 
with the adoption of each of the narratives identified. Multiple and possibly competing 
narratives with respect to a same issue create normative dilemmas in any polity, but even 
more so in the EU, which represents itself as a principled polity, a characterised power – 
civilian, normative, ethical, etc. – driven by its norms and values.7 What we propose to do 
in this article is to identify the normative claims in the narratives embedded in the EUGS 
and the normative dilemmas arising from them.
The article is divided into three sections. The first introduces the elements of continuity 
and change with respect to the topic of migration found in EU strategic documents, spe-
cifically comparing the 2003 and the 2016 strategies of the European Union and retracing 
what happened between those dates that led to the importance attached to migration in the 
latter. The second section takes a closer look at how migration is handled in the EUGS and 
explores the different migration-related narratives. The third explores some of the possible 
political and normative dilemmas that could arise from them, their referents and their 
legitimating arguments. A brief concluding section wraps up the article.
5narrative theory has developed widely (see czarniawska, Narratives in Social Science Research). What we do here is rely on 
a light concept of narrative as a conceptual device that allows us to identify correlations between the characterisation of a 
social phenomenon in a given society and that society’s representation of the social world (including self/other relations).
6In general, the securitisation of discourse on migration has been broadly described. The ohchr denounced the existence of 
a “toxic narrative on migration” (http://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/Migration/pages/Shapingthepublicnarrativeonmigration.
aspx), which the ohchr aimed to reframe through a collective effort. Scholars have long identified processes of securiti-
sation of the public debate in europe (see, for instance, allen, A Decade of Immigration) and of discourse on migration 
(see huysmans, The politics of insecurity; Fakhoury, Securitising migration; neal, Securitization and Risk at EU Border; 
léonard, “eU border security and migration”; ceccorulli, Framing irregular immigration).
7cf. Manners, “normative power europe”; lucarelli and Manners, Values and Principles; aggestam, “Introduction: ethical 
power europe?”.
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2003/2016: the rise of migration as a crucial issue
Migration was not explicitly mentioned in the 2003 Security Strategy (ESS), nor implied as 
a key determinant of the EU’s foreign action.8 In other words, migration was not considered 
on its own account but rather as a by-product of other phenomena.9
In 2003, the EU was still taking its first steps in the areas of migration and asylum policy, 
despite the strong mandate received from the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty and the following 
Tampere Council. Only discussed as a Home Affairs issue, migration was overshadowed by 
threats like terrorism and organised crime, the former being the main concern prompting 
the drafting of the Security Strategy. The only dimension of migration that gained attention 
was the potential trafficking of migrants, a by-product of criminal activities. Indeed, the 
2003 document recognised the possibility of migration movements as a consequence of 
disruptive events, such as conflicts or competition for natural resources. Also, it acknowl-
edged that demographic imbalances could be a potential cause of instability, especially if 
occurring in neighbouring regions.10 Still, the document provided no strategic framework 
for understanding and handling migration – nor was this corrected in the 2008 revision.11
That migration was not dealt with in security terms is not surprising: the phenomenon 
was certainly present at the time, but it was not perceived as an emergency. However, in the 
last few years ignoring migration and its strategic dimension is no longer an option. The 
massive inflow of migrants reaching (or trying to reach) European shores has thrown into 
question not only the EU’s receptive capabilities but also its fundamentals. Since the Arab 
Spring in 2011, which uprooted many agreements on immigration control between the EU 
and its member states and North African countries, the EU has been forced to develop its 
agency in migration matters – without really having the means, or frequently the will, to do 
so. As a matter of fact, the member states remain fundamental actors in Europe’s govern-
ance of migration, leaving the EU to cope with different national measures in various areas 
(from reception conditions for asylum seekers and refugees to national lists of ‘safe coun-
tries’). At the same time, the Union has had to struggle to maintain and enhance solidarity 
among the member states to make the overall EU migration system work. Problems like 
the lack of solidarity (particularly but not exclusively on the part of the Visegrad countries) 
with the most exposed countries (Italy and Greece) as well as the recent uncoordinated 
reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area, are serious. The situation 
reached breaking point when illegal border crossings almost tripled in 2014 with respect 
to 2013 (almost 285,000 irregular immigrants and asylum seekers),12 while in 2015 there 
were more than 1 million arrivals by sea.13 The rising pressure of migration demanded a 
more hands-on kind of action from the Union.
However, two elements already mentioned in the first EU strategic document and later 
covered much more broadly in the 2016 Global Strategy are worth noting. The first is the 
strong emphasis on how “internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked”; 
8european Union, Secure Europe in Better World (ESS).
9on the genesis of supranational governance of migration in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, see among others, 
Kaunert, European Internal Security.
10Ibid., 4, 7.
11european Union, Providing Security in Changing World.
12european parliament, “Irregular immigration in the eU”.
13Unhcr, “over one million sea arrivals”.
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86   M. CECCORULLI AND S. LUCARELLI
the second is the need for an external dimension of what was intuitively perceived to be 
an internal matter.14
In 2015, the EU issued two complementary Agendas (‘things to do’), one on Security, 
and the other on Migration,15 which, combined, set the stage for the future inclusion of 
migration in the EUGS. The first document, aimed at creating an area of internal security, 
underlined the need to identify and cope with new challenges, working on both their internal 
and external dimensions. It clarified that the EU’s internal security and global security were 
tightly nested one inside the other and mutually dependent. This called for closer linkage 
between Justice and Home Affairs, on the one hand, and Common Security and Defence 
Policies (CSDP), on the other. It also stressed the need for a “joined-up inter-agency and 
cross-sector approach” in policy determination, due to the increasing connectedness of 
the different types of security threats.16 Furthermore, it specified that “[t] his Agenda has 
to be seen in conjunction with the forthcoming European Agenda on Migration, which 
will address issues directly relevant to security, such as smuggling of migrants, trafficking 
in human beings, social cohesion and border management”.17
Although lacking some of the features expected of a proper strategy, the 2015 Agenda 
on Migration embodied a well detailed set of conceptions of how migration should be 
conceived and governed by the EU in the years to come. Aimed at “reaping the benefits 
and addressing the challenges” of migration, the Agenda on Migration envisages short- and 
long-term measures to strengthen the EU’s ability to deal with migrant pressure, provide 
adequate integration prospects and respond to “the economic demands of a Europe in 
demographic decline” (2). All these objectives are central to the EU’s existence, its current 
and prospective capacity to act on a global scale and to “make a positive difference”.18 In 
order to devise a coherent and effective European policy, attentive to all its dimensions, 
cross-sector cooperation in development, trade, employment, foreign and home affairs had 
to be promoted (6). The idea already embedded in this document is that migration – and 
in particular its external dimension – would be central to the High Representative’s work 
on the forthcoming Strategic Review and the new Neighbourhood Policy. The Agenda on 
Migration also explained that “[m] igration should be recognized as one of the primary areas 
where an active and engaged EU external policy is of direct importance to EU citizens”. (7)
Clearly, the 2015 Agendas set the ground for the full inclusion of migration in the 2016 
Global Strategy. The way migration is actually understood and represented in the EUGS is 
the topic of the next section.
Migration ‘unpacked’: multiple narratives 
Migration finds a broad and comprehensive treatment in the sixty pages of the EUGS. The 
richness and multifaceted nature of the concept are reflected in the variety of terms fea-
tured in the document: for example “mobility”, “border management”, “origin and transit 
countries”, “migrants”, “refugees”, “legal migration”, “readmission”, “return”, “displacement”, 
14european Union, ESS, 2.
15european commission, European Agenda on Security and European Agenda on Migration, respectively.
16Such as organised crime, trafficking, market for illicit drugs, terrorism, terrorist foreign fighters.
17european commission, European Agenda on Security, 4.
18european Union, EUGS.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [2
.43
.21
9.1
22
] a
t 2
3:2
1 2
2 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR  87
“displaced”, “reception”, “asylum”, “irregular flow”, “legal and circular channels”, “demogra-
phy”, “visa facilitation” and “visa liberalization”.
Moreover, the document includes a plurality of narratives when dealing with migration, 
which correspond to different ways of understanding the phenomenon. None is particu-
larly original, as all had already been drawn on in previous documents (namely the two 
abovementioned agendas) and many are shared with other international actors, but the 
combined set of narratives is quite telling of the political and normative dilemmas the EU 
and its member states are facing. We have identified six such narratives: ‘the economic-so-
cietal narrative’, ‘the values narrative’, ‘the security narrative’, ‘the resilience narrative’, ‘the 
selective narrative’ and ‘the global responsibilities narrative’. For each, we provide a descrip-
tion according to the EUGS and, where possible, evidence of its political implementation.
The economic-societal narrative 
The economic-societal narrative refers to migration as an opportunity for the hosting com-
munity. The EU recognises that, to be competitive, its economy needs skills which cannot 
“always and immediately” be found inside the EU’s labour market (7). There is often an 
imbalance between needs and available skills, and more efforts should be made to match 
them appropriately through new mobility packages or skills initiatives. At the same time, 
the Union is well aware that sooner or later it is going to suffer from serious demographic 
imbalances. The decline in population is going to exacerbate the ageing phenomenon: while 
the EU will need highly skilled jobs, the working-age population will shrink, and the elderly 
population will increase substantially,19 posing challenges on many fronts.20 Making the EU 
more attractive should hence be given high priority.21
In the EUGS, this narrative of migration is signalled by terms such as “mobility” or 
“human mobility”, and in policymaking terms such as the endorsement of visa facilita-
tion, liberalisation processes and circular migration possibilities. Economic prospects but 
also societal links are likely to be strengthened by increased mobility opportunities. This 
argument surfaces throughout the entire document, and mainly refers to candidate states 
(Turkey), the neighbourhood, as well as Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. In the 
EUGS, the economic-societal narrative implies a positive assessment of increased mobility 
opportunities as they can contribute to the objectives of both the EU and the countries of 
origin through migrants’ empowerment and remittances.22
At the policy level, skilled migrants have been guaranteed priority access to the EU 
through the Blue Card Directive. According to the Directive, the admission of skilled work-
ers and their families is facilitated and the social and economic rights granted them are 
very similar to those of EU citizens.23 However the measure has been difficult to implement 
due to intricate admission and intra-mobility conditions, resulting in the member states 
frequently pursuing national recruitment plans for highly skilled workers.24
19livi Bacci, “l’europa ha bisogno”.
20ceccorulli et al., “europe ‘depopul-ageing’ bomb?”.
21european commission, European Agenda on Migration, 14-5.
22european Union, EUGS, 13.
23council of the european Union, On the conditions of entry.
24See, among others, Triandafyllidou and Isaakyan, “eU management of high skilled migration”.
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The values narrative
The values narrative ingrained in the EUGS underlines the importance of upholding the EU’s 
values when dealing with migration. The focus on values is not only presented as a moral 
imperative, but also as a way of guaranteeing internal coherence and external credibility.25 
The EU Global Strategy states that “[l] iving up consistently to our values internally will 
determine our external credibility and influence”.26 This implies that respect for values is a 
key ingredient of the EU’s external action. In the EUGS, adherence to values also implies 
respect for domestic, European and international migration law. Hence, “remaining true 
to our values is a matter of law as much as of ethics and identity”. As the EU’s values are 
understood and presented as universal, this narrative is cosmopolitan in nature. In relation 
to migration, it implies respecting migrants’ human rights at every step of the migration 
process.27
As for the practices, the values narrative is probably one of the most challenged.28 In the 
case of asylum, for example, relevant EU legislation makes reference to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, the non refoulement principle and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, in which “the right to asylum” is explicitly stated. Moreover, and differently 
from other actors on the international landscape, the European Union has significantly 
extended the meaning of protection, endorsing not only protection from risk of persecu-
tion but also from serious harm: this has engendered a new form of protection, ‘subsidiary 
protection’, that goes well beyond refugee status.29 Also, EU legislation is open to more 
extensive forms of ‘humanitarian protection’ adopted in member states.30
Nevertheless, the right to asylum and the protection offered by the EU as fundamental 
rights have been put into question recently by proposals for revision of the EU Asylum 
System aimed at reducing the number of asylum requests as well as the rights granted 
asylum seekers and refugees.31 While the proposals still have to be evaluated by the EU’s 
institutions (they are currently under scrutiny in the European Parliament), clear signs of 
a weakened understanding of protection can already be noticed. For example, there is a 
proposal for introducing mandatory evaluation for ‘sufficient protection’ achievable in other 
‘safe’ countries, where exactly what ‘sufficient’ means is not explained.32 With respect to 
migration management more generally, the European Union’s aim to reach common min-
imum standards has mostly translated into lower levels of protection than those expected 
and sometimes in diluted safeguards on human rights protection. For example, by remaining 
vague on the standards for detention of irregular immigrants and asylum seekers, the EU 
has de facto authorised different detention modalities in the member states (in terms of 
length, structures and living conditions).33
25on the relation between values and interest in the eUGS, see Youngs, “how to Balance Interests and Values”.
26european Union, EUGS, 15.
27The many references to human rights in the text have been widely noticed by commentators, see Doody, “eU Global 
Strategy under threat”.
28For an overview of values and principles in eU foreign policy, see lucarelli and Manners, Values and Principles.
29european Union, Directive 2011/95/EU.
30Ibid.
31See Fassi and lucarelli, European Migration System.
32european commission, Proposal for a Regulation, 17.
33european Union, Directive 2013/33/EU.
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The security narrative
The security narrative draws largely on the idea of an increasingly blurred internal-external 
divide and the alleged connection between migration and other security threats (especially 
smuggling and terrorism). This notion has, to a significant extent, informed the handling 
of migration in the Home Affairs domain.34 In this narrative, the key word is (external) 
“border management”. The EUGS frequently maintains that “the external cannot be sepa-
rated from the internal. In fact, internal policies often deal only with the consequences of 
external dynamics.”35 Addressing challenges that are both internal and external in nature 
such as terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber and energy security and organised crime, makes 
external border management a necessity.36 The external border management type of secu-
rity narrative is, hence, based on the idea that the main rights-holder is the community 
inside the EU’s borders. It assumes that the protection of borders is a priority and this has 
implications as far as the management of migration is concerned.
However, as in the Agenda on Migration, the EUGS identifies migrants themselves as 
another subject of security policy – the target of potential threats originating from outside 
the EU. In this case, the objective is to “save migrants’ lives” from the networks of smugglers 
and criminal organisations and the tragedies occurring largely at sea, and to ensure their 
“safe” arrival in the EU.37
In practical terms, two main developments, both mentioned in the EUGS, have resulted 
from this dual security narrative: the establishment of the European Border and Coast 
Guard and the launch of migration-related CSDP operations. The Commission had already 
underlined the necessity to create a European Border Guard in a 2001 Communication,38 
and over the years, a large number of studies and proposals were produced.39 The European 
Border and Coast Guard, an upgrade of the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union (FRONTEX), was definitively approved in September 2016.40 It involves a “joined-up” 
approach, as the Global Strategy calls it, meaning integrated border management, includ-
ing multiple tasks (from border control to search and rescue operations and protection of 
the Schengen area against illegal immigration); multiple tools (external and internal risk 
analysis, the return of third country nationals, large-scale technology); and cross-sector 
cooperation (among the member states, among EU agencies and with third countries).41
The objective mentioned in the Global Strategy to employ CSDP missions and opera-
tions seemingly addresses the internal-external security nexus. According to the document, 
external policies and provisions should be made “migration sensitive” and consistent with 
internal ones to deal with the many aspects of migration.42 The Agenda on Migration had 
34See, for example, lavenex and Wichmann, “external Governance of Internal Security”; longo, “Justice and home affairs”.
35european Union, EUGS, 17.
36Ibid., 20.
37european commission, European Agenda on migration, 3.
38european commission, Common policy on illegal immigration.
39on the genesis of the agency and its first institutionalisation through FronTeX, see léonard, “The creation of FronTeX”. 
on the proposal for the eU Border and coast Guard, see rijpma, “proposal for european Border and coast Guard”.
40european council and european parliament, European Border and Coast Guard.
41Ibid., 12.
42european Union, EUGS, 50.
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already opened the way to such a joined-up approach by recommending that CSDP oper-
ations be used “to systematically identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers”43 
and that migration become a part of ongoing CSDP missions (specifically in Mali and 
Niger, which is the main migration route towards Libya) through more attention to border 
management.44 The idea of a “migration component” in CSDP operations in Africa is also 
envisaged in the EUGS.45 The CSDP EUNAVFOR-MED operation ‘Sophia’, launched in 
the central Mediterranean in June 2015, mirrors this joined-up logic by aiming “to disrupt 
the business of human smuggling and trafficking in the Mediterranean and […] prevent 
loss of lives at sea”.46 The mission also aims at securing EU borders, for it has been given 
a mandate to train the Libyan Coast Guard. Both the instruments analysed interpret the 
security narrative as one intended to save migrants’ lives while securing EU borders.
The resilience narrative 
There is probably no better word than ‘resilience’ to describe the EU’s approach to the 
external dimension of migration.47 Resilience aims to “enable migrants and refugees to 
stay close to home and avoid taking dangerous journeys”.48 It is not a new idea, but has 
gained particular purchase with the refugee crisis. In a 2003 Document, the Commission 
explained that developing the asylum system of transit countries so as to turn them into 
first countries of asylum could allow protection to be delivered “close to needs” and that 
this would reduce incentives to look for protection in the European Union.49 The EUGS 
builds on these documents and clearly underlines the role of resilience for the EU’s security: 
“Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, resilience – the 
ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal 
and external crises – benefits us.”50
Applied to migration, resilience is mainly invoked with reference to possible new mem-
ber states, neighbours and surrounding regions – that is, “transit and origin countries”. 
The resilience approach is supposed to contribute to reducing the number of economic 
migrants and asylum seekers en route to the EU.51 This reduction is expected to be pursued 
through selective engagement with countries of origin, alleviating the conditions leading 
to migration, improving those countries’ capacity to manage migration, encouraging them 
to readmit nationals. At the same time, the EU aims to increase education and livelihood 
opportunities in transit countries. As for asylum seekers, the strategy involves focusing 
on the root causes of displacement and helping origin and transit countries build up their 
reception and asylum management capacities (also through the adoption of relevant inter-
national obligations – that is, the Geneva Refugee Convention). In both cases, the approach 
encompasses a variety of tools across different policy areas (development, trade, diplomacy, 
43european commission, European Agenda on Migration, 3.
44Ibid., 5.
45european Union, EUGS, 36.
46european external action Service, European Union Naval Force.
47on the external dimension of immigration and asylum policy, see lavenex and Uçarer, “The external Dimension of 
europeanization”; Boswell, “The ‘external dimension’ of eU Immigration” and Monar, “The eU’s growing role in aFSJ”.
48european commission, Establishing a New Partnership Framework, 5.
49european commission, Towards a more accessible asylum system.
50european Union, EUGS, 24.
51See pastore, “relazioni euro-africane e migrazioni”, 243.
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education, health, security, etc). If effective, resilience could have a positive impact on third 
countries in the long term, as it envisages an overall improvement in living conditions; at 
the same time, though, it implies transferring most of the duties of migration management 
to those countries.
The idea that migration management involves the engagement of third countries was 
already well ingrained in the EU system before the EUGS. As a matter of fact, strategic 
reflections on the ‘external dimension’ of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice, requiring 
third states to improve their migration management capacities, date back to 2005.52 The 2011 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility inspired by the Arab Spring events urged the 
creation of Mobility Partnerships as comprehensive packages of measures agreed upon with 
third states.53 Through these (and others) forms of cooperation, the EU has tried to negotiate 
readmission agreements with transit countries envisaging the return of also third country 
nationals. Results have been poor, however, as international law only obliges countries to 
accept the return of their own nationals. In recent years, new impulse has been given to the 
negotiation of readmission agreements with countries of origin, particularly in Africa.54
The Emergency Trust Fund for Stability “addressing the root causes of irregular migration 
and displaced persons in Africa” agreed upon at the Valletta Summit between European 
and African partners on November 2015 went exactly in the direction of “retailoring some 
of the EU’s assistance with the aim of visibly improving citizens’ wellbeing”.55 This tool is 
aimed at “promoting resilience” especially in the Sahel, Lake Chad, Horn of Africa and 
other areas of North Africa.56 Comprehensive approaches have been envisaged for differ-
ent countries,57 with the aim of establishing new Partnership Frameworks (“compacts”) to 
ensure that development and Neighbourhood Policy tools “reinforce local capacity-building, 
including for border controls, asylum, counter-smuggling and reintegration efforts”, while 
addressing the root causes of irregular flows and displacement.58
The selective narrative
The selective narrative refers to the aim of the EU to attach ‘priorities’ to different categories 
of migrants. One example is the need to ensure the “orderly and managed” arrival of persons 
in need of international protection.59 The EUGS endorses the argument and supports the 
“safe, regulated and legal” arrival of refugees. The main logic behind this narrative maintains 
that chaotic arrivals cannot be accepted; conversely, orderly arrivals, managed for example 
through resettlement plans, would ensure a safe journey and proper treatment for persons 
in need. The best example of this approach is the EU-Turkey Statement, signed in March 
2016. The political deal between the EU Heads of State or Government and the Turkish 
52european commission, Strategy on the External Dimension.
53european commission, Global Approach to Migration. on the limits of creating a Global approach to Migration and 
Mobility, see hampshire, “Speaking with one voice”.
54as reported in a commission document, “regional Development and protection programmes are focused on providing 
protection to those in need, but also on enhancing resilience of refugees, internally displaced persons and host commu-
nities”. european commission, European Agenda on Migration, 10.
55european Union, EUGS, 26.
56european commission, European Union Emergency Trust Fund.
57european Union, EUGS, 27. priority countries of origin and transit are Senegal, Mali, niger, nigeria and ethiopia.
58european commission, Establishing a New Partnership Framework, 2.
59Ibid., 13.
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government aimed at substituting irregular immigration with legal channels of resettle-
ment in the EU for Syrian refugees. In accordance with the statement, all new irregular 
immigrants or asylum seekers crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 
2016 were to be returned to Turkey. At the same time, for every Syrian returned to Turkey, 
another Syrian is supposed to be resettled in the EU. Hence, the message conveyed is that 
only “Syrians arriving through regular channels” are eligible for international protection.
Although not mentioned in the EUGS, the relocation and hotspot systems for the inter-
nal management of the refugee crisis also follow this logic aimed at supporting order. Both 
systems ‘sort out’ people in clear need of international protection (defined by nationality) 
to be re-distributed among member states, distinguishing between those generally eligible 
for international protection and those to be returned because ineligible. Selection dynamics 
are also observable in the increasing importance attached to ‘safe country’ concepts (safe 
country of origin, first country of asylum and safe third country) as criteria in examining 
asylum requests.60 In this case, the identification of a safe state to which a migrant can be 
returned is considered a discriminant between founded and unfounded or inadmissible 
asylum requests. Priority access into the EU is also granted to skilled migrants through the 
Blue Card Directive as mentioned earlier.
The global responsibilities narrative
Starting with the first lines of the EUGS, the EU makes clear that global action is neces-
sary to address the root causes of conflicts and poverty and “champion the indivisibility 
of human rights”,61 all objectives that inevitably touch on migration. Humanitarian duties 
are clearly globally shared responsibilities, at least in the way they have been intended in 
recent decades, and should involve joint efforts of UN agencies, emerging players, regional 
organisations, civil society and local communities.62
In the realm of migration, it is especially with respect to asylum that global responsibili-
ties have taken on particular importance. Accordingly, collective efforts should be made to 
offer safe haven to people forced to leave their residence and to alleviate unequal burdens 
weighing on the countries most affected.63 In concrete terms, this notion has resulted mostly 
in resettlement programmes. Considered a “durable solution” by the same UNHCR,64 reset-
tlement involves the transfer of displaced persons identified by the organisation as in clear 
need of international protection to another state that can provide protection and other rights.
However, resettlement plans are only implemented on a voluntary basis and handled by 
national states and some EU member states do not have such programmes. In July 2016, 
the European Commission proposed a Union Resettlement Framework, conveying the 
message that a common EU approach has to be developed and that resettlement should 
be a binding EU mechanism regulated by common specific procedures.65 This might be a 
way for the EU to comply more effectively with its share of global asylum responsibilities 
and show its agency in this respect.
60european commission, EU ‘safe countries of origin’ list.
61european Union, EUGS, 17.
62european Union, EUGS, 28.
63See, for example, Gibney, “refugees and justice between states”.
64See http://www.unhcr.org/solutions.html
65european commission, Establishing a Union Resettlement Framework.
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The narratives presented above provide a picture of the complex and multifaceted 
approaches to migration as envisaged by the EU, and attest to the importance of migra-
tion in its foreign and security policy. The coexistence of different and even contradictory 
narratives creates tensions in the EU’s governance of migration. For instance, the border 
protection security narrative clashes with the global responsibility narrative as EU border 
protection could lead to the adoption of measures that are less attentive to migrants’ rights 
or simply prioritises the security of the internal space over that of migrants. The next section 
specifically addresses the political and normative dilemmas arising from the arguments 
underlying the described narratives.
Political and normative dilemmas of migration narratives
In the following, we discuss some of the political and normative dilemmas engendered by 
the various narratives. Narratives are taken one at a time for the sake of clarity, however 
some dilemmas arise precisely at the intersection of more than one narrative. Keeping 
narratives and dilemmas separate allows us to distinguish various actors (such as, the EU, 
member states, third countries and migrants, among others) and objectives (such as, the 
protection of EU borders, EU values, global responsibilities, security), without diminishing 
the complexity of the phenomenon.
Dilemmas of the economic narrative 
The EUGS’s insistence on the economic narrative is well motivated. As seen, the EU suffers 
from a serious demographic deficit that needs to be dealt with. The selection of skilled 
migrants (as envisaged in the selective narrative) is a way of balancing out that deficit that 
is profitable for the European job market. However, as Massimo Livi Bacci argues,66 time 
matters. Livi Bacci reckons that massive immigration can effectively serve this purpose only 
on the conditions that 1) the timespan is a generation, 2) that net immigration amounts 
to around 1-2 million migrants per year, and 3) that long-term, properly funded policies 
complementary to integration prospects are put in place.67 Realistically speaking, these 
conditions are probably too difficult to fulfil for an actor that has already shown strong 
deficiencies in addressing the current situation.68
A further dilemma of the economic narrative has to do with internal resources: the EU 
may be forced to strike a balance between accepting massive migration without the resources 
to handle it, on the one hand, and having to privilege the provision of effective reception, 
access to the welfare system and integration tools for a restricted number of migrants, on 
the other.69
In normative terms, attracting skilled migrants might pose dilemmas with respect to 
the migrants’ countries of origin: the EU’s insistence on certain skills as a criterion for 
selection of migrants (evident in the proposal for the revision of the Blue Card Directive) 
66livi Bacci, “l’europa ha bisogno”.
67Ibid., 934.
68The arrival of more than one million asylum seekers in 2015 is considered an exceptional event, but solidarity among member 
states in terms of burden sharing (mainly through the relocation plan) has nevertheless fallen short.
69See, for example, on this point, ruhs, The price of rights.
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may result in a brain drain in underdeveloped countries. At the same time, these resources 
are essential if the EU is to remain competitive and able to compensate for a diminishing 
and ageing population. In other words, attracting skilled workers from abroad may help 
the EU cope with its economic and demographic needs, but may also negatively affect the 
economic and social needs of the countries of origin.
Dilemmas of the values narrative
Insisting on values and the rule of law, the values narrative poses more than one 
dilemma. The EU has always stood out for positing values as the touchstone of its 
external credibility and influence.70 Accordingly, the most apparent problem is non-re-
spect or the non-prioritisation of some of the EU’s values. This refers particularly to 
the EU’s failure to privilege the protection of human rights over control of migrant 
flows.71 Recently, there has been criticism of an ever more restrictive asylum system 
that clashes with the right to asylum enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union.72
Clearly, this is not just a matter of non-compliance, as there are some intrinsic normative 
dilemmas involved in being a value-led polity. No matter how correct its behaviour, the 
EU will always be confronted with the moral conflict between protecting its own citizens 
and its institutional achievements (a legitimate aim which is a value in itself), on the one 
hand,73 and providing assistance to an enormous number of incoming migrants, on the 
other. The Statement with Turkey is but one of the EU’s recent provisions that explicitly 
raises questions about the EU’s values by challenging the compatibility between protecting 
EU territory and asylum seekers’ rights. This is a manifestation of the irreconcilable clash 
between the EU’s communitarian and cosmopolitan “universal” souls, which poses more 
troubles to the EU than to traditional Westphalian states because of its self-representation 
as a value-driven polity.74
Finally, given that respect of national, European and international law is equally central to 
the EU’s values, it is remarkable that these layers do not exist coherently and harmoniously 
side by side as far as migration is concerned. National and European law may display signif-
icant differences, as far as the rights, integration possibilities and requirements of migrants, 
as well as family reunification opportunities and detention modalities, to name just a few, are 
concerned. Some national legislations are quite restrictive with respect to certain values the 
EU supports; and recent legislative proposals of the European Commission, such as those 
contained in the reform of the asylum system, seem to follow a restrictive path as well.75 
Some seem to pay lip service to largely shared fundamentals of international law (e.g. the 
non refoulement principle) while instead serving the EU’s interests.
70european Union, EUGS, 15.
71amnesty International, The Human Cost of Fortress Europe.
72For a critical position on the impact of eU asylum policies in the eU, see ecre, “Time to Save the right”.
73Grevi, “a global strategy for european Union”; Dijkstra, “Introduction: one-and-a-half cheers”; Mälksoo, “From eSS to eU 
Global Strategy”.
74cf. lucarelli and Manners, Values and Principles.
75Menéndez, “The refugee crisis”.
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Dilemmas of the security narrative 
The political and normative dilemmas of the security narrative may be easier to identify, 
as they are often associated with the securitisation of migration.76 Both security objectives 
of the EU (saving migrants and protecting external borders) have been widely discussed.77 
Scholars have argued that the ‘save the migrants’ rhetoric mixes security and humanitarian 
approaches in order to make the EU’s action more urgent (we need to act before they risk 
their lives), or more restrictive (we have to prevent them from putting their lives at risk) or 
to shift the focus of the ‘crisis’ onto the migrants (we need to face the humanitarian crisis).78 
Much literature also insists on the negative implications that ensuring secure borders may 
have for migrants.79
While both security objectives are central to the Union, the question arises whether the 
prioritisation of either goal may impact (negatively) on the other – that is, if they are to 
some extent incompatible.80 This is a point that has frequently been made against the Mare 
Nostrum search and rescue operation, led by Italy between 2013 and 2014. The expectation 
to be saved at sea, so the argument goes, encourages migrants to attempt the journey, and 
since they resort to the services of ruthless smugglers, this actually subsidizes their business 
activity. All of this results in ever more massive and chaotic arrivals in the EU with negative 
repercussions on the EU’s reception capacity and European societies in general. That being 
so, saving migrants’ lives at sea – the argument goes – is not in compliance with a moral 
obligation, but rather with misplaced humanitarianism, with negative consequences for 
both migrants (who are prompted to keep risking their lives) and European societies.81 The 
counter-argument, is that not saving lives at sea with search and rescue operations, makes 
us responsible for the lives lost, as the root causes of migration are such that migrants would 
decide to take the risk of travelling by sea anyway.
Dilemmas of the resilience narrative
The EU’s aim to help build up capacities on migration and asylum management in the origin 
and transit countries is in line with what has been suggested by global migration agencies. 
For example, in 2003, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees recognised that 
asylum is most effective when it is close to needs – hence close to the states from which 
people escape.82 In a similar way, if migration journeys may put migrants’ lives at risk, then 
addressing the causes that trigger the outflows in the first place seems a suitable strategy.
76The literature on the securitisation of migration is ample; see, for example Buzan, People, states and fear; Buzan, Wæver 
and De Wilde, Security, a New Framework for Analysis; huysmans, The politics of insecurity; neal, “Securitization and risk”. 
For recent approaches see, for example, Fakhoury, “Securitizing migration” and ceccorulli, Framing irregular immigration.
77on the contribution of FronTeX to the securitisation of migration, see, for example, léonard, “eU border security and 
migration”.
78See, for example, Musarò, “cosmopolitan solidarity vs. national belonging”. For a critical review of the role of ‘crisis’ in 
the consolidation of control practices and techniques of governing, see Jeandesboz and pallister-Wilkins, “crisis, routine, 
consolidation”, and perkowski, “Deaths, Interventions, humanitarianism”.
79See, for example, campesi , “FronTeX”; human rights Watch, “eU policies put refugees at risk” and Triandafyllidou and 
Dimitriadi, “Deterrence and protection”.
80A European Agenda on Migration recognises that we are facing a “difficult balancing act”, 2.
81“UK axes support for Mediterranean migrant rescue operation”, The Guardian, 27 october 2014. https://www.theguardian.
com/politics/2014/oct/27/uk-mediterranean-migrant-rescue-plan
82european commission, Towards a more accessible asylum system.
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However, what precisely does resilience mean in the case of the EU and third countries? 
The critical observation that can be made is that, with the aim of enhancing third countries’ 
resilience to cope with migration, the EU is in fact “eternalising the burden”.83 Arrangements 
like the EU-Turkey deal or the newly-launched compacts with African countries raise a 
number of ethical issues over the EU’s externalisation of migration management to make 
up for its ineffectiveness: the burden of migration management is left in the hands of third 
(transit and origin) countries, which can then be blackmailed in the form of condition-
ality (the so-called ‘more for more’ approach). In other words, the EU can be accused of 
externalising burdens and keeping a patronising attitude with respect to these countries. 
The primary aim in this case is control of migration, not the development of better living 
conditions for would-be migrants.
Moreover, what if migrants are kept in third countries because the third countries are 
believed to be resilient given the EU’s efforts, but living conditions in the countries of origin 
have not been improved? It is clear that ‘resilience’ is a long-term effort, but the EU may be 
tempted to anticipate the effective achievement of resilient states and societies to meet its 
short-term objectives. This is another dilemma related to the resilience logic.
Dilemmas of the selective narrative 
The selective narrative makes it possible to draw a clear dividing line between “persons in 
need of international protection” (according to EU criteria) and economic migrants (or 
‘false’ asylum seekers). Yet, it also gives priority to skilled (wanted) over unskilled migrants 
(less necessary for the EU’s competitiveness). This implies creating categories in a domain 
that generally eschews classification. The EU is not blind to this reality: “Every person’s 
migration tells its own story. Misguided and stereotyped narratives often tend to focus 
only on certain types of flows, overlooking the inherent complexity of this phenomenon, 
which impacts society in many different ways and calls for a variety of responses.”84 Yet, 
migration as a practical policy issue requires some kind of systematisation and predicta-
bility. It is in this vein that the demands in EU documents for “order” in the management 
of migration and for “ordered and legal” arrivals have to be interpreted. Inevitably, though, 
with classification comes selection and possibly prioritisation. This is clear, for example, in 
the frequent tendency in recent years to base arguments on nationality criteria, using them 
to assess vulnerabilities (the relocation programme, hotspot system,85 resettlement plans, 
return of irregular immigrants and safe countries concepts).86 Clearly, the risk is that the 
EU could lose sight of the subjectivity of each migrant, regardless of his/her nationality or 
any other categorisation.
Dilemmas of the responsibility narrative
Finally, the responsibility narrative plays up the need to share responsibilities in the man-
agement of a complex, multifaceted and global phenomenon.87 Ideally, responsibility should 
83See, for example, Wagner and anholt, “resilience as the new leitmotif”; palm, “Did 2016 Mark a new Start?” Further on 
externalisation, see Dover, “Toward a common eU Immigration policy”.
84european commission, European Agenda on Migration, 2.
85For a critical analysis of the hotspot system, see ecre, “Implementation of hotspots”.
86See for example ecre, “ecre comments”.
87See, on this point, newland, “new approaches to refugee crisis”.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [2
.43
.21
9.1
22
] a
t 2
3:2
1 2
2 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR  97
be shouldered irrespective of whether one is directly affected or not by a given event: 
accordingly, ‘wealthy’ countries can reasonably be accused of having neglected their global 
responsibilities in the current refugee crisis.
This narrative stresses the need to share responsibilities with third countries. This goes 
almost uncontested per se.88 The real dilemma is whether the burden the EU bears is fair 
compared to that of third countries (such as Lebanon, Jordan or Turkey), especially in 
light of its capabilities and its declared adherence to a set of principles that have informed 
its action in the past, such as the “responsibility to protect”.89 This dilemma is mirrored 
perfectly in the logic underlying global resettlement, which is, in principle, aimed at shar-
ing the responsibilities weighing on the most affected countries, but in practice has been 
poorly used if compared to the latter’s real needs. A broader dilemma concerns the scope 
of the EU’s responsibility and questions the feasibility – and even the legitimacy – of the 
EU’s ‘global’ action on migration, a dilemma that the EUGS seems to have addressed by 
identifying and giving priority to some geographical regions over others.
Each narrative rests on a rationale that entails political and normative dilemmas. We have 
pointed out some of the main ones, with no pretence of having been exhaustive.
Conclusions
Migration has gradually become a key issue in the European Union, challenging its effec-
tiveness, its coherence and its credibility, both internally and externally. While absent from 
the 2003 Security Strategy, migration took centre stage in the 2016 EUGS.
A close analysis of the narratives used in this and other documents, as well as the policy 
measures legitimised by these narratives, has revealed the EU’s many approaches to migra-
tion, torn between the intent to respect its values and principles and the call for safe and 
orderly arrivals of migrants and asylum seekers on EU territory. None of the EU’s narratives 
(nor the respective approaches) clearly prioritises the safety of the EU’s territory over that 
of the migrants. Yet, a closer look shows that the EU’s choices are sometimes affected by the 
aim to protect its borders and territory from a (perceivedly) excessive inflow.
There are objective difficulties and subjective weaknesses behind the EU’s struggle with 
migration. On the one hand, striking a balance between the economic and demographic 
needs of the EU (which would call for more, and selected migrants), fear of the divisive 
role of migration among the member states (which would call for less, and more ordered 
inflows), and the need to uphold EU humanitarian values (which would call for saving 
the migrants’ lives and respecting their rights, including not sending them back to unsafe 
areas) is indisputably difficult. The result is a ‘compromise approach’, legitimised by different 
narratives, partially complementary, partially at odds with each other. On the other hand, 
the EU’s economic and demographic need for massive immigration could probably be met 
through immigration if the EU were internally cohesive and if it and its member states 
invested significantly in migration and integration policies, to be implemented according 
to the principle of (domestic and international) solidarity.
Yet, such management of the process is conditional in any case on a slowdown in the 
current pace of immigration,90 and none of these conditions seems likely to be met in the 
88See, for example, crawley et al., Destination Europe?.
89See, for example, oxfam, “Syria refugee crisis”.
90livi Bacci, “l’europa ha bisogno”.
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foreseeable future. As a consequence, the most plausible scenario remains one in which the 
EU is more and more severely criticised by its member states and citizens, transnational 
non-governmental organisations and international actors (third countries and international 
organisations), for its (allegedly substandard) ability to cope with migration. A more atten-
tive reflection on the political and normative dilemmas listed above is in order to design 
policies that are not just compromises between different interests, but also deliberate political 
choices resonating with what the EU aims to stand for in the world.
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